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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between the corporate
governance system and technical efficiency in Italian manufacturing. We use a non-
parametric frontier technique (DEA) to derive technical efficiency measures for a
sample of Italian firms taken from 9 manufacturing industries. These measures are then
related to the characteristics of the corporate governance system. Two of these
characteristics turn out to have a positive impact on technical efficiency: the percentage
of the company shares owned by the largest shareholder and the fact that a firm belongs
to a pyramidal group. Interestingly, a trade-off emerges between these influences, in the
sense that one is stronger in industries where the other is weaker.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the relationship between the corporate
governance system and productive (technical) efficiency in Italian manufacturing. The Italian
corporate governance system has some distinctive features that make it quite different from
the Anglo-Saxon system. It is characterised by a high degree of direct ownership
concentration, both for listed and unlisted companies; owners are mainly physical persons,
often linked by family relationships to other investors in the firms, with a very limited
involvement of financial intermediaries. Besides, more than 50% of Italian industrial
companies belong to a pyramidal group
1 where “upstream” firms along the chain of control
directly own majority stakes in “downstream” firms. This structure has allowed stable control
to be exerted over both small and large Italian companies in an environment where hostile
take-overs as a disciplinary device play no role (Bianchi et al., 1997; Visintin, 1999).
These features of the corporate governance system are regarded by the corporate finance
literature as an optimal response to the asymmetric information problem arising from the
separation between ownership and control in institutional settings where there is scant
protection of minority shareholders. Indeed, in countries (like Italy) with poor protection of
minority shareholders,
2 losing control involuntarily and thus becoming a minority shareholder
may be so costly a proposition in terms of relinquished private benefits that the controlling
shareholders do everything to keep control, keeping their voting rights to themselves and
having little interest in selling shares in the market.
The impact of a corporate governance system of this kind upon firm performance is
ambiguous: clearly, concentration of shareholdings has the advantage of aligning cash flow
                                                          
1 Here we use the definition of ‘pyramidal group’ provided by Gugler (2001): a pyramidal group is a business
entity where legally independent firms are controlled by the same family or institution through a chain of
unidirectional ownership relations.
2 According to Bianchi et al. (1997), examples of the fact that minority shareholders are poorly protected are the
following: fiduciary duties of company directors are difficult to enforce; proxy fights are discouraged by a very
strict regime for proxies, and take-over rules are inefficient.3
and the control rights of outside investors. Large shareholders address the agency problem in
that they have both a general interest in profit maximisation and enough control over the
assets of the firm for their interests to be respected. Performance is therefore expected to
improve with large shareholder ownership. However, as ownership concentration grows to
very large proportions, owners gain nearly full control and may be wealthy enough to prefer
to use the firm to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority
shareholders, with detrimental effects on performance. The impact of ownership
concentration on performance is also ambiguous in economic environments where pyramidal
groups are very widespread. Indeed, in this case the situation is even less straightforward.
Even if no shareholder directly owns a large amount of shares, there is still a large
blockholder (either a family or an institutional investor) that ultimately controls the whole
group, possibly severing the link between ownership concentration and firm performance and
not necessarily acting in the interests of the minority shareholders. On the other hand,
belonging to a group may entail more stringent monitoring of firm performance, as well as
several types of external economies.
These issues have already been analysed in several empirical studies, briefly surveyed
in Section 2, which focus on the link between corporate governance and some measure of
profitability (such as Tobin’s Q or the ratio of net income to total assets). Some studies have
also considered the impact of the Italian corporate governance system on managerial
incentives and firm performance. Bianco and Signorini (1996) and Bianco and Casavola
(1999) examine the links between types of control, ownership concentration and firm
performance, and are in this sense the closest predecessors of the present paper.
Our paper differs from earlier contributions by measuring firm performance through
technical efficiency, as defined by the ability to minimise inputs for given outputs or to
maximise outputs for given inputs (Farrell, 1957). In our view, financial measures of firms’4
performance based on balance sheets are likely to be affected by a host of (fiscal, speculative,
short-term) factors not related to the fundamentals of firm performance: they therefore
potentially obscure the impact on the latter of the corporate governance system. Relying on
technical efficiency has the additional advantage of placing our paper within the very large
literature on the frontier analysis of production.
3 This has advantages inasmuch as it provides
us with a well defined benchmark. Frontier techniques have been extensively used, also
within Italian manufacturing, and various explanations have been provided for the
determination of efficiency across firms. Hence derives the interest of gauging the additional
explanatory power of the characteristics of the corporate governance system within this field,
as we know of no previous attempt to relate efficiency scores to these factors.
4 More
precisely, we focus on the relationship between technical efficiency and three features of the
corporate governance system: the percentage of firm's shares owned by the largest
shareholder, the possibility that a firm belongs to a pyramidal group, and the institutional
characteristics of the main shareholder.
Measuring technical efficiency also required us to conduct the empirical analysis on
firms from 9 manufacturing industries, analysing each industry on its own. The data were
drawn from the Mediocredito Centrale surveys and covered years 1994 and 1997. We
adopted a two-stage approach (Lovell, 1993). First, technical efficiency was measured using a
non-parametric frontier technique (DEA). The efficiency scores were then related to the
characteristics of the corporate governance system and to some other controls through OLS
and Logit regression models.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief summary of the
literature on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Section 3
                                                          
3 Fried et al. (1993) still provide a very valuable introduction to this literature.
4 Obviously, there has been a longstanding interest in frontier analysis about the impact of types of ownership on
productive efficiency. Our analysis can be seen as a new example of this kind of interest.5
describes in some detail the data-set and the empirical procedures; Section 4 presents the
results, while Section 5 makes some concluding remarks.
2. The background literature
The relationship between corporate governance features and firm performance has been
the object of a large body of analysis both theoretical and empirical. Interest in these issues is
prompted by the fact that corporate governance mechanisms are supposedly able to  solve the
basic agency problem existing within the firm due to the separation between ownership and
control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The
essence of this agency problem concerns the difficulties faced by financiers in ensuring that
their funds are not expropriated or wasted on unattractive projects which prove detrimental to
firm performance.
Corporate governance structures are therefore basic mechanisms with which to solve
this asymmetric information problem.
5 Among possible alternatives, the high concentration of
control rights in the hands of investors with a collectively large cash-flow stake is a solution
typically adopted in institutional frameworks where there is no legal protection of minority
shareholders.
6 In the absence of real disciplinary devices, managers have considerable
discretion and power to pursue their own objectives, which may not necessarily coincide with
those of the shareholders (Roe, 1994). In this case, the problem of management control can be
overcome by concentrating both ownership and voting power in the hands of large
shareholders. The latter have a strong incentive to monitor managers closely, since a large
fraction of the benefits of monitoring can be appropriated. Also, concentrated voting rights
equip shareholders with the necessary power to influence the decision-making process. In
                                                          
5 Zingales (1997) defines a corporate governance system as “a complex set of constraints that shape the ex post
bargaining over the quasi rents generated in the course of a relationship”.
6 See Schleifer and Vishny (1997) for a survey of the different institutional solutions to the problem of separation
between ownership and control.6
many countries, large shareholdings in some form are the norm. La Porta et al. (1997, 1999)
point out that ownership of large companies in rich economies is typically concentrated
among controlling shareholders, most of which are families often actively involved in
company management. In Germany, large commercial banks control over a quarter of the
votes in major companies (through proxy voting arrangements); in France, cross-ownership
and so-called core investors are common; in Italy, as well as in Finland and Sweden,
corporations typically have controlling owners who are often the founders or their off-spring.
7
Of course, this solution to the agency problem may entail some costs. Large investors
represent their own interests, which may not coincide with those of other investors in the firm
or of other stakeholders. In using their control rights to maximise their own welfare, large
investors may collude with managers and other large shareholders, thus expropriating
minority shareholders and using the firm to generate private benefits of control, with
potentially detrimental effects on firm performance (Burkart et al., 1997; Pagano and Roell,
1998). In addition, ownership concentration in the hands of large shareholders may reduce
market liquidity and restrict possibilities for diversification.
The benefits from large shareholder control and the costs of the potential expropriation
of minority shareholders on firm performance have already been subject to empirical scrutiny.
Morck et al. (1988) present evidence on the relationship between cash-flow, managerial
ownership (percentage of shares owned by the board of directors) and Tobin’s Q for a sample
of large US firms. They find a positive relationship between managerial ownership and
Tobin’s Q in the range of ownership between 0% and 5%, a negative relationship between 5%
and 25%, and again a positive relationship beyond the 25% level. One interpretation of this
result is that, consistently with the role of incentives in reducing agency costs, performance at
first improves with higher managerial ownership (convergence of interests). However, as
large owners gain further control, they are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate
                                                          
7See also Bebchuck and Roe (1999) on this.7
private benefits not shared by minority shareholders (entrenchment). In a refinement, the
authors find that among older firms, the presence of the founding family on the board reduces
Tobin’s Q on average, whereas among younger firms, the presence of the founding family
raises the Q. This suggests that the founders (or their off-spring) in old firms are too
entrenched to be removed.
Further evidence on the US, corroborating the above results, is provided by Wruck
(1989), McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Kole (1995). The analysis in Kole (1995) suggests
that the positive relationship between firms’ performance and ownership is sustained at higher
levels of ownership for small firms than it is for large firms. Investigation of the impact of
ownership concentration on firms’ performance in European countries has focused mostly on
the role played in this respect by pyramidal groups. Indeed, in European countries (with the
notable exception of UK) concentrated holdings of voting blocks are very common, which
implies that the main conflict of interest is likely to arise between the ultimate owner of the
company and minority shareholders. Large blockholders (controlling whole groups) may try
to expropriate minority shareholders also in the absence of a large shareholder. On the other
hand, belonging to a group may entail more stringent monitoring of firm performance, as well
as several types of external economies (greater specialisation, closer control over sale and
purchase channels, reduction of risk and of credit constraints and so on). In the absence of
pyramidal groups, a relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance
should reappear, possibly along the non-monotonic lines described above for the US. The
studies cited in Gugler (2001) analyse the links between corporate governance and firms’
performance in Continental European countries. None of these studies establishes a consistent
link between ownership concentration and firm performance. No consistent relationship is
found either between firm performance and the nature of the main shareholder (family groups,
corporate groups, individuals). Most of these studies, however, do not take simultaneous
account of ownership concentration and the nature of the main shareholder. Some empirical8
studies have also been carried out on Italian firms. Caprio and Floreani (1994) test for the
possibility of rent extraction from large shareholders by analysing the effects of control
transfers on stock market prices. Brunello et al. (2001) analyse the implications of the Italian
corporate governance system for the determination of executive pay levels. Bianco and
Signorini (1996) compare the growth in various indicators (sales, investments, labour
productivity) across different control models (absolute control, family control, coalition
control and group control) in a sample of Italian manufacturing firms organised into the four
Pavitt sectors. They do not find very significant relationships between performance and
control models. Bianco and Casavola (1999), using a different sample of Italian
manufacturing firms, find that ROI, ROS and a proxy for managerial ability are lower for
firms belonging to pyramidal groups. The profitability measures are also related to ownership
concentration in a non-monotonic fashion. The lowest ROI and ROS are achieved where the
largest shareholder owns more than 66% of the voting capital, whereas the highest ones are
attained at an intermediate level where the largest shareholder holds between 50% and 66% of
the equity. The explanation offered for these results is that both high ownership concentration
and pyramidal groups make control insufficiently contestable, which hampers the efficient
selection of controlling agents.
As this short survey has made clear, there is still considerable uncertainty about the
nature of the relationships between corporate governance system and technical efficiency,
particularly in countries where pyramidal groups are very common. The aim of our analysis
was to provide new and more robust evidence in this regard by relying on technical efficiency
as a measure of performance, and by simultaneously controlling for three sets of potentially
relevant corporate governance variables: ownership concentration, nature of the main
shareholder, presence of pyramidal groups. This enabled us to assess the probable interactions
among these factors.9
3. The data-set and the empirical framework
a) The data-set
The empirical analysis was carried out on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms taken
from the 6
th and 7
th Mediocredito Centrale surveys for years 1994 and 1997. The
Mediocredito Centrale survey (henceforth the Survey) is one of the most complete sources of
information about Italian manufacturing. It is conducted on firms (not plants or
establishments) with more than 10 employees. The procedures for data collection are mixed:
sampling is adopted for firms with 11 to 500 employees, the sample being a stratified one
with random extraction. For firms with more than 500 employees, the Survey covers the
entire population. The sampling strata are singled out on the basis of the number of employees
and of the class of activity. The sample dimension for each stratum is determined according to
Neyman’s formula, in a manner such that it is representative of the population at the level of
each administrative region.
We had balance-sheet data from 1992 to 1997, as well as qualitative and quantitative
data on the structural characteristics of the sampled firms, regarding the legal and
organisational structure of the firm, its investment and financial policy, the quality of its
human capital and its R&D investment. However, most of these structural data, including
those relating to the corporate governance system, were only available for 1994 and 1997. We
consequently concerned ourselves with those two years only.
It is a well known tenet of efficiency analysis that, in order to get meaningful frontier
estimates, one should consider firms characterised by a similar technology. In the present
context, this means that the empirical analysis should have been carried out at a level of
aggregation low enough for the above condition to obtain. This implied disaggregating the
manufacturing sector into different industries, bearing in mind that the samples obtained
should be reasonably large. Indeed, recent studies (Kneip et al., 1998; Gijbels et al., 1999)10
have shown that a major problem of small-sample bias arises when non-parametric frontier
approaches are used. We therefore carried out the empirical analysis for the manufacturing
industries listed in Table 1 (whose names follow the NACE Rev. 1 classification).We did not
consider other industries because the samples constructed for them were substantially smaller
(from 100 to 150 observations: according to the evidence reported in Kittelsen, 1999, DEA
begins to be characterised by substantial small-sample bias around these values). Also to be
noted is that our samples pooled 1994 and 1997 together. In order to obtain larger samples,
we did not estimate separate frontiers for these two years, which are close enough to lend
credibility to the assumption of a common technology.
b) The empirical procedure
The format of our empirical analysis is straightforward enough. First we applied a non-
parametric frontier technique, DEA-VRS (Banker et al., 1984), to a conventional production
set in order to measure technical efficiency across firms (computing the so-called efficiency
scores). Then we adopted techniques also well established in the literature to assess the
relationship between the efficiency scores and a set of explanatory variables. These variables
included a dummy for the observations belonging to 1997, some factors widely believed in
the international and Italian literature to be closely associated with technical efficiency
(basically dimensional and territorial dummies), and three sets of characteristics of the
corporate governance system. We took various functions of the percentage of shares owned
by the largest shareholder, a binary variable equal to one if a firm belonged to a pyramidal
group, and two binary variables equal to one if the main shareholder was, respectively, a
foreign resident or a physical person.
It is well known that DEA-VRS can be input-oriented if the linear program minimises
inputs for given outputs, output-oriented if the linear program maximises outputs for given11
inputs, and non-oriented if the linear program simultaneously maximises outputs and
minimises inputs. The latter choice seemed to be particularly desirable in our case, where no
assumptions could be made with any confidence about the exogeneity of either inputs or
outputs (unless we were prepared to assume perfect competition throughout all firms and
industries). The technical efficiency scores were obtained from:
max { q  | [ (1 - q) X
k , (1 + q) Y
k ] Î T }
where X
k and Y
k are the inputs and outputs of any given observation k, and T denotes the
technology.
8
A further advantage of DEA is, of course, that no assumption is required concerning the
functional form of the production frontier. On the other hand, DEA does not allow for the
presence of stochastic noise in the data generation process. Moreover, relying on a non-
parametric technique makes the above described two-stage procedure unavoidable, because
the usual regularity assumptions underlying DEA can only be made with sufficient confidence
for a restricted set of conventional inputs and outputs. In particular, the relationship between
output and the characteristics of the corporate governance system, for given values of the
other inputs, can in principle be either positive or negative and can only be assessed through
regression analysis.
c) The variables
As already said, we followed the existing literature on efficiency measurement as
closely as possible. Starting with the DEA production set, value added was chosen as the
(only) measure of output; while the gross book value of depreciable assets and the number of
employees were used as measures of the capital and labour inputs respectively. Moreover, the
                                                          
8 Calculations were performed using the EMS package kindly made available by Holger Scheel, Universität
Dortmunds, Germany. Further details on the algorithms can be found in Scheel (2000).12
literature on Italian manufacturing
9 suggests that the labour input can be measured much
better if employees are split into blue and white collars. We included two more variables in
this production set: the degree of educational attainment, as measured by the weighted
average of the years spent in education by the employees, and a binary variable controlling for
the research and development (R&D) activities within the firm.
Once DEA had been applied to the above production set, the efficiency scores obtained
were regressed on their potential determinants. Ownership concentration was measured by the
percentage of company shares owned by the largest shareholder and by various functions of
this variable. Following most of the literature, we allowed for a non-monotonic relationship
between ownership concentration and firm performance. More specifically we constructed
five binary variables taking the value of 1 when the percentage of shares held by the main
shareholder was between the ranges specified below and 0 otherwise.
10 The ranges considered
were: a) between 50% and 66%, b) between 66% and 99%, c) between 50% and 99%, d)
above 66%, e) above 99%. The choice of the cut-off points was suggested by a variety of
considerations. The 66% level was chosen because, under Italian company law, it enables the
main shareholder to carry out important transactions without any other shareholder being able
to intervene. The choice of 99% was prompted by the desire to ascertain whether absolute
control has some particular impact on efficiency, as suggested by the literature on Italian
capitalism (Bianco and Signorini, 1996).
We then checked whether the firm belonged to a pyramidal group or not. As already
said, the existence of pyramidal groups is a distinctive feature of Italian capitalism. According
to Bianco and Casavola (1999), pyramidal groups make control insufficiently contestable,
hampering the efficient selection of controlling agents. On the other hand, belonging to a
group may entail more stringent monitoring of firm performance, as well as several types of
                                                          
9 See for instance Balloni (1984), Prosperetti and Varetto (1991), Ofria (1997), who all carry out their empirical
analyses on previous issues of the Survey.13
external economies. Finally, we included among the corporate governance variables two
dummies accounting for the characteristics of the main shareholder. Following Bianco and
Casavola (1999), we focused on two possible types: a foreign resident, or a physical person
residing in Italy. In the first case a favourable impact was expected on performance, given
that foreign residents should monitor firms more stringently. On the contrary, in the second
case the company was supposed to be run with less emphasis on monitoring.
As for the other potential determinants of efficiency, it is a well established in the
Italian literature that location matters for productive efficiency. This can probably be ascribed
to the operation of local factors such as infrastructure endowment, external economies linked
to technological potential and level of industrialisation, the presence of organised crime, and
so on. We controlled for these factors in our analysis by using four territorial dummies
(following common practice, we divided Italy in North-West, North-East, Centre and South).
Another factor widely believed to have an impact on efficiency is size. We controlled for this
by sorting out the firms into five size categories (which again were derived from common
practice): a) from 11 to 20 employees, b) from 21 to 50 employees, c) from 51 to 250
employees, d) from 251 to 500 employees, e) more than 500 employees. Five dimensional
dummies were then constructed from this classification.
11
4. The results
We first describe the main results, then assess their robustness, and finally provide a
first attempt at their interpretation.
a) The main results
                                                                                                                                                                                    
10 Squared and cubic functions of the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder were also used, but
they never proved significant and are not reported in the results.
11 Obviously, in regression analysis one of the territorial dummies and one of the dimensional dummies were left
out to avoid the so-called multicollinearity trap.14
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics of the DEA non-oriented technical efficiency
scores for each industry. To repeat, in this case we computed the efficiency scores from a
production set including value added as output, while the inputs were the stock of capital,
blue-collar employees, white-collar employees, educational attainment and an R&D dummy.
The efficiency scores generally have pretty high mean values (with the exception
perhaps of Non-electrical machinery). Also, their standard deviations are reasonably low.
These descriptive statistics suggest that the production sets were sufficiently well specified
and yielded reliable technical efficiency scores.
Tables 3 and 4  set out the main results obtained from regressing the DEA scores on the
set of explanatory variables illustrated in the previous section. In order to allow for sectoral
heterogeneity, we ran a different regression for each industry. Two types of regression models
were used: OLS and Logit (the Eviews 3.1 package was used in both cases). As efficiency
scores are variables bounded between zero and one, OLS were applied on the transformation
of the efficiency scores suggested in Kalirajan and Shand (1988) which allows them to vary
between –¥ and +¥. The Logit exploits the distribution of scores between zero and one in a
different way. If we construct a dependent variable taking the value of 1 if the firm has an
efficiency score of 1 (is efficient) and 0 otherwise, the Logit can be used to determine whether
the corporate governance pattern helps in predicting the probability that a firm will be on the
frontier. For OLS, we relied on White heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-covariance
matrices to compute the standard errors.
Different specifications were estimated for each of these regression models. The baseline
specification only included the 1997 dummy, the territorial and dimensional dummies, plus
the dummies for the type of the main shareholder (denoted TYPE1 and TYPE2) and the
pyramidal group dummy (denoted GROUP). This specification was augmented in several
ways. First, we introduced PRC, the percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder.15
Then, we allowed for a non-monotonic relationship between ownership concentration and
technical efficiency, through dummies controlling for different ranges of ownership
concentration. We simultaneously controlled for the following ranges: a) between 50% and
66% and above 66% (dummies SH1A and SH2); b) between 50% and 99% and above 99%
(dummies SH1B and SH3); c) between 66% and 99% and above 99% (dummies SH1C and
SH3).The results obtained suggested two additional specifications which controlled only for
ranges between, respectively, 50% and 99% (through dummy SH1B), and 60% and 99%
(through dummy SH1C).
In order to present the results more compactly, we report the t-ratios for GROUP,
TYPE1 and TYPE2 from the baseline specification only, as well as the t-ratios for the
ownership concentration proxies from their respective equations. From the baseline
specification we also report R
2 and F-statistic for the OLS, and Mc Fadden R
2 and LR-statistic
for the Logit. We focus on the t-ratios because we are mainly interested in the significance
and sign of corporate governance variables. The other diagnostics for the baseline equation
are indicative of the explanatory power of our estimates.
There is broad consistency between the OLS and Logit results. The fit is not very close, but
the R
2’s are perfectly comparable to those obtained in the literature. Moreover, the control
variables included in the baseline specification are always very comfortably jointly
significant. In Table 3, at least one of the ownership concentration variables is positive and
significant (at the 10% level) in four industries (Apparel; Food, beverages and tobacco; Non-
electrical machinery; Rubber and plastic products); it is negative and significant for
Fabricated metal products. In Apparel and Non-electrical machinery we find a linear
relationship between ownership concentration and technical efficiency, while in the other
industries the relationship appears to be non-monotonic. The pyramidal group dummy is
positive and significant in five industries (Food, beverages and tobacco; Chemicals;
Fabricated metal products; Non-electrical machinery; Non-metallic mineral products). In16
accordance with a priori expectations, a trade-off emerges between the effects of the two sets
of variables. This is made clearer by Table 5, which contrasts the t-ratio for GROUP with the
highest t-ratio for one of the ownership concentration variables.A clear negative correlation
appears between the two sets of variables. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between
these values is –0.50. Much less of a pattern is apparent for the TYPE1 and TYPE2 dummies:
TYPE1 is significant in two industries only and with an a priori unexpected (negative) sign,
TYPE2 is marginally significant in one industry only.
Very similar considerations apply to the Logit results presented in Table 4. At least one of the
ownership concentration variables is positive and significant in four industries (Apparel;
Chemicals; Non-electrical machinery; Rubber and plastic products); it is negative and
significant for Fabricated metal products. Once again there is a linear relationship between
Apparel and Non-electrical machinery and a non-monotonic relationship among the other
industries. The pyramidal group dummy is positive and significant in four industries (Food,
beverages and tobacco; Chemicals; Fabricated metal products; Non-metallic mineral
products). A trade-off emerges between the effects of the two sets of variables in this case too.
Consider Table 6, which is the analogue of Table 5.The Spearman rank correlation coefficient
between these values is –0.31. Note that most of the t-ratios are higher than the OLS ones. A
possible explanation is that the OLS standard errors are biased because the efficiency scores
are not independently distributed (there is correlation between the scores of firms dominated
by the same facet of the production frontier). Finally, TYPE1 and TYPE2 are never
significant.
b) Assessing robustness
As far as the OLS regressions are concerned, the most likely source of bias in the results
is the presence of outliers among the efficiency scores. As already said, DEA cannot allow for
stochastic noise in the production set. Hence, very low scores (say below 0.15-0.20) may17
simply reflect the occurrence of some exceptional circumstances. These outliers may bias at
least the standard errors for our OLS estimates (possibly the coefficients too if they are
correlated with the regressors). In an attempt to protect our estimates against these potential
biases, we applied OLS to a sample from which we excluded the lower 5% of the efficiency
scores. The results, given in Table 7, show much the same patterns as in Table 3. T-ratios
generally increase and now also approach significance for the ownership concentration
variable in Electrical machinery and apparatus. More importantly, there is always a trade-off
between the impacts of group and ownership concentration.
Modifying the sample would be of very little relevance for the Logit. However, the
robustness of these results could be assessed by computing GLM standard errors, which are
robust to general misspecification of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable, as
well as to heteroskedasticity (see for instance Fahrmeir and Tutz, 1994). As can be seen from
Table 8, the t-ratios obtained with these standard errors are very similar to the previous ones,
which is evidence in favour of the soundness of the Logit estimates.
c) A first attempt at interpretation
We now attempt to provide some explanation for the sectoral characteristics of our
results. Our main points of interest are (a) why pyramidal groups are significant in some
particular industries and ownership concentration is significant in some others; (b) why there
is a linear relationship between ownership concentration and technical efficiency in some
industries (Apparel, Non-electrical machinery), whereas in other industries (Chemicals,
Electrical machinery, Food and, to some extent, Rubber) the relationship appears to be non-
monotonic.
Considering the univariate distributions of corporate governance variables (within and
between industries) proves to be of little help in answering these questions. On the other hand,18
one may usefully start from the suggestion in Kole (1995) to the effect that firm size matters
in determining the relationships between firms’ performance and corporate governance
variables. Tables 9-10 consider the distribution across size classes of the share of firms
belonging to a pyramidal group and of the percentage of shares held by the main shareholder.
We provide cell means for three classes: a) small, from 11 to 50 employees, b) medium, from
51 to 250 employees, c) large, more than 250 employees. To facilitate interpretation, we rank
industries according to the significance of the GROUP variable (we take the mean of the t-
ratios from Tables 3 and 4). It turns out from Table 9 that industries where GROUP is more
significant are characterised by a larger share of small firms belonging to a pyramidal group,
while the share of medium or large firms belonging to a pyramidal group is immaterial in this
respect. Given our priori belief that a positive relationship between GROUP and technical
efficiency reflects the operation of external factors, it seems plausible to conclude that this
relationship is mostly dictated by what happens to small firms: larger firms are more likely to
internalise these factors without belonging to a pyramidal group. Naturally, this raises a
further question: why are some industries characterised by a larger share of small firms
belonging to a pyramidal group? We cannot provide an answer: considering some customary
classifications (like capital intensity or Pavitt classification) is of very little help. Yet, even
our descriptive finding is of some interest, as we shall see below.
Turning now to the relationship between ownership concentration and technical
efficiency, we find indirect support for the suggestion that the positive relationship between
firms’ performance and ownership is sustained at higher levels of ownership for small firms
than it is for large firms (Kole, 1995). Table 10 clearly shows that larger firms are
characterised by a higher percentage of shares held by the main shareholder, with the
exception of firms in the Apparel industry. Since the latter is one of the industries
characterised by a linear relationship between ownership concentration and technical19
efficiency, we may conjecture that industries where this relationship is non-monotonic are
also industries where the variation of ownership concentration between size classes is a large
proportion of the total variation of ownership concentration: a rise in ownership concentration
largely coincides with passage to a higher size class, where entrenchment is more likely. To
provide evidence on this, we calculated for each industry the coefficient of variation between
size groups and the total coefficient of variation of PRC. The last column of Table 10 reports
the ratio between these two coefficients, providing sufficient support for our conjecture. The
variation of ownership concentration between size classes is a relatively small proportion of
the total variation of ownership concentration in the industries characterised by a linear
relationship (Apparel, Non-electrical machinery), while the opposite is for the case of most of
the industries characterised by a non-monotonic relationship (Chemicals, Electrical machinery
and apparatus, Rubber), although not of Food.
It is fair to point out that the above considerations do not explain either the lack of
significance of the share variables in Textiles (while the lack of significance of GROUP in
this industry can be explained by the low share of small firms belonging to a pyramidal
group), or why there is a significantly negative relationship between ownership concentration
and technical efficiency for Fabricated metal products. Indeed, the latter industry is an outlier
also because GROUP is highly significant even if pyramidal groups are not very frequent
among small firms.
All this descriptive evidence helps shed some light on the implicit assumption of our
analysis, and of much of the related literature, to the effect that corporate governance patterns
determine performance, not the other way around. In principle, causality could well run in the
other direction: successful firms provide incentives to shareholders to increase their stakes
(similarly, successful firms are more likely to become part of pyramidal groups).20
Recall however that a higher significance of GROUP is associated with a larger share of
small firms belonging to a pyramidal group, while the correlation between significance of
GROUP and share of large firms belonging to a pyramidal group is small or even negative.
Furthermore, note from Table 9 that the share of firms belonging to a pyramidal group is
always larger for large firms. Thus, whatever the factors dictating adhesion to a group may be,
they do not seem to be related to the factors determining the significance of GROUP. On the
other hand, as already said, if one believes that GROUP is significant because of the operation
of external factors, it makes sense to maintain that the significance of GROUP is determined
by the share of small firms belonging to a pyramidal group.
The “reverse causality” argument would also find it difficult to explain the non-
monotonic relationship between ownership concentration and technical efficiency clearly
apparent for all industries except Apparel and Non-electrical machinery. While it is widely
believed that entrenchment is more likely to occur in large firms and/or at high levels of
ownership concentration (the evidence presented here favours the former alternative), it is not
easy to understand why shareholders should fight shy of absolute control in successful firms.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper has empirically analysed the relationship between corporate governance
patterns and technical efficiency in Italian manufacturing. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon system,
the Italian corporate governance system is characterised by a high degree of direct ownership
concentration. This kind of corporate governance system is considered to be an optimal
response to the existence of asymmetric information in countries where minority shareholders
have scant protection. Yet the impact of such a corporate governance system upon firms’21
productive performance is ambiguous. On the one hand, large shareholders both have a
general interest in profit maximisation and exert enough control over the assets of the firm to
have their interests respected. On the other hand, as ownership concentration increases, large
owners gain nearly full control, and they may be wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to
generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders, with
detrimental effects on firms’ performance. The presence of pyramidal groups may complicate
things even further. In this case, large blockholders may try to expropriate minority
shareholders in order to pursue their own private interests even in the absence of a direct large
shareholder. Also, pyramidal groups may have an – a priori ambiguous - influence of their
own on firms’ performance.
Very few empirical studies have analysed the impact of this corporate governance
system on firms’ performance in the Italian institutional setting. This paper differs from
earlier contributions mainly because of its focus on technical efficiency and on the
interactions among the corporate governance variables influencing performance. Hopefully,
our evidence may prove relevant to other countries whose corporate governance systems are
characterised, like Italy’s, by the presence of both large shareholders and pyramidal groups.
The impact of various indicators of corporate governance on technical efficiency has been
assessed in a sample of firms from Italian manufacturing using a two-stage approach. First,
efficiency scores were calculated using the non-parametric DEA technique, and then the link
between these scores and corporate governance was appraised by means of regression
analysis.
The results suggest that two corporate governance variables have a positive impact on
technical efficiency: the percentage of firm's shares owned by the largest shareholder and the
fact that a firm belongs to a pyramidal group. In accordance with a priori expectations, a
trade-off emerges between these influences: ownership concentration has a stronger impact on22
technical efficiency in industries where the impact of the pyramidal group is weaker. Across
industries, a higher significance of GROUP is associated with a larger share of small firms
belonging to a pyramidal group. This makes sense if one believes that GROUP is significant
because of the operation of external factors: larger firms are more likely to internalise these
factors without belonging to a pyramidal group.
Furthermore, in industries where the influence of GROUP is relatively weak, the profit-
maximising incentive for large shareholders to promote the technical efficiency of their firms
outweighs any inducement to gain private benefits of control with detrimental effects on
performance. This is especially true of small firms. For large firms the two effects are broadly
of the same strength, and ownership concentration appears to have no significant impact on
technical efficiency.
TABLE 1 – The Industry Samples
Industries Number of observations
Apparel 260
Chemicals 241
Electrical machinery and apparatus 400
Fabricated metal products 524
Food, beverages and tobacco 344
Non-electrical machinery 865
Non-metallic mineral products 306
Rubber and plastic products 292
Textiles 49623







Apparel 0.77 0.19 54 (20.8 %)
Chemicals 0.77 0.19 53 (22.0 %)
Electrical machinery and apparatus 0.76 0.17 67 (16.8 %)
Fabricated metal products 0.73 0.16 58 (11.1 %)
Food, beverages and tobacco 0.75 0.18 53 (15.4 %)
Non-electrical machinery 0.61 0.19 68   (7.9 %)
Non-metallic mineral products 0.74 0.18 49 (16.0 %)
Rubber and plastic products 0.74 0.17 50 (17.1 %)
Textiles 0.72 0.18 64 (12.9 %)
TABLE 3. – OLS, complete sample, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
Apparel Chem Electr Met Food Mach NonMet Rubber Textile
GROUP +0.29 +1.76 +1.61 +2.29 +2.00 +1.76 +2.14 +1.52 +1.13
TYPE1 -3.53 -1.23 +0.55 -1.21 -0.92 +0.52 -5.54 -0.36 -0.06
TYPE2 -1.26 -0.37 -0.60 -0.23 +0.08 -0.06 +0.25 +0.49 -1.63









































SH1C +1.16 +0.28 +0.76 -1.14 +1.71 +0.80  -0.56 +1.24  -1.0324
SH3 +1.27  -0.63 +0.23 -2.46 +0.63 +1.63 +0.60 +0.59 +0.61
SH1B +0.39 +1.06 +1.28 -0.04 +0.81 -0.20 -0.84 +1.30 -1.46






















TABLE 4. – Logit, complete sample
Apparel Chem Electr Met Food Mach NonMet Rubber Textile
GROUP +0.15 +2.19 +1.59 +1.79 +2.33 +0.85 +2.14 +1.25 +0.17
TYPE1 -- -0.48 +0.70 -0.40 -0.18 -0.40 -0.00 +0.40 -0.24
TYPE2 -1.40 +0.61 -0.22 -0.51 +1.25 -0.33 +0.97 +1.17 -0.86





























































SH1B +1.15 +1.74 +1.15 +0.74 +0.27 -0.23 -0.71 +1.44 -1.32





























Electrical machinery and apparatus +1.61 +1.59
Fabricated metal products +2.29  -0.04
Food, beverages and tobacco +2.00 +1.71
Non-electrical machinery +1.76 +1.88
Non-metallic mineral products +2.14 +0.60
Rubber and plastic products +1.52 +1.67
Textiles +1.13 +0.61







Electrical machinery and apparatus +1.59 +1.15
Fabricated metal products +1.79 +0.74
Food, beverages and tobacco +2.33 +0.85
Non-electrical machinery +0.85 +2.46
Non-metallic mineral products +2.14 +1.12
Rubber and plastic products +1.25 +2.06
Textiles +0.17 +0.3426
TABLE 7. – OLS, 5% trimmed sample, White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
Apparel Chem Electr Met Food Mach NonMet Rubber Textile
GROUP +0.12 +1.67 +1.51 +2.13 +1.83 +1.96 +2.90 +1.50 +0.83
TYPE1 -3.75 -0.92 +0.57 -1.69 -0.46 +0.39 -6.30 -0.44 -0.27
TYPE2 +1.19 -0.26 -0.10 -0.69 +0.29 -0.09 +0.62 +0.64 -1.63





























































SH1B +0.49 +1.19 +1.56 -0.46 +1.13 +0.38 -0.35 +1.27 -1.08






















TABLE 8. – Logit, complete sample, GLM standard errors
Apparel Chem Electr Met Food Mach NonMet Rubber Textile
GROUP +0.15 +2.11 +1.59 +1.83 +2.40 +0.86 +2.11 +1.20 +0.20
TYPE1 -- -0.48 +0.70 -0.40 -0.18 -0.40 -0.00 +0.40 -0.24
TYPE2 -1.38 +0.68 -0.36 -0.44 +1.33 -0.27 +1.05 +1.10 -0.84





























































SH1B +1.13 +1.68 +1.23 +0.76 +0.30 -0.20 -0.67 +1.41 -1.33






















TABLE 9. – The Distribution of GROUP across Size Classes
Industries 11-50 empl. 51-250 empl. > 250 empl.
Food 0.15 0.27 0.33
NonMet 0.17 0.34 0.74
Met 0.09 0.32 0.65
Chem 0.19 0.42 0.94
Electr 0.14 0.37 0.76
Rubber 0.14 0.32 0.93
Mach 0.11 0.35 0.77
Textile 0.07 0.31 0.78
Apparel 0.07 0.26 0.42
TABLE 10. – The Distribution of PRC across Size Classes
Industries 11-50 empl. 51-250 empl. > 250 empl. CV ratio
Food 0.61 0.64 0.75 0.251
NonMet 0.62 0.66 0.82 0.400
Met 0.64 0.68 0.83 0.449
Chem 0.65 0.75 0.85 0.449
Electr 0.61 0.69 0.81 0.392
Rubber 0.65 0.7 0.88 0.484
Mach 0.63 0.67 0.79 0.335
Textile 0.65 0.69 0.81 0.317
Apparel 0.68 0.71 0.68 0.13128
LEGEND OF TABLES
In Tables 1-10 the industries are indicated by self-explanatory shortened names.
Tables 3-4 and 7-8 report the t-ratios for GROUP, TYPE1 and TYPE2 from the baseline
specification, as well as the t-ratios for the ownership concentration proxies from their
respective equations. From the baseline specification we also report Adj. R
2 (the coefficient of
determination corrected for degrees of freedom) and F-statistic for the OLS, and Mc Fadden
R
2 and LR-statistic for the Logit. The LR-statistic, which is asymptotically distributed as a c
2
variable with (in our case) 11 degrees of freedom, tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope
coefficients except the constant are zero. It is the analog of the F-statistic in linear regression
models and tests the overall significance of the model. Mc Fadden R
2 is the analog to the R
2 in
linear regression models and is computed from the log-likelihood ratio. The TYPE1 dummy
cannot be included in the Logit estimates for Apparel because all the observations equal to 1
for this dummy are associated with inefficient firms, and conversely. Hence the LR-statistic is
distributed with 10 degrees of freedom in the Apparel industry.
Table 10 reports the ratio between the coefficient of variation of PRC between size groups
and the total coefficient of variation of PRC. The coefficient of variation between size groups
is calculated on five dimensional groups (from 11 to 20 employees, from 21 to 50, from 51 to
250, from 251 to 500, more than 500 employees). The results are qualitatively unchanged if
the three dimensional groups shown in Table 10 are considered instead.
LIST OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VARIABLES:
GROUP = dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm belongs to a pyramidal group and
0 otherwise;
TYPE1 = dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the main shareholder is a foreign resident
and 0 otherwise;
TYPE2 = dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the main shareholder is a physical person
residing in Italy and 0 otherwise;
PRC = percentage of shares held by the main shareholder;
SH1A = dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the percentage of shares held by the main
shareholder is between 50% and 66% and 0 otherwise;
SH1B = dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the percentage of shares held by the main
shareholder is between 50% and 99% and 0 otherwise;
SH1C = dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the percentage of shares held by the main
shareholder is between 66% and 99% and 0 otherwise;
SH2 = dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the percentage of shares held by the main
shareholder is bigger than 66% and 0 otherwise;
SH3 = dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the percentage of shares held by the main
shareholder is bigger than 99% and 0 otherwise.29
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